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court of appeals has determined that the New York standard
encourages heightened "prosecutorial care" 243' in responding to
discovery requests and establishes a clear standard.
People v. Van Pelt244
(decided June 5, 1990)

A criminal defendant contended that his due process rights under the federal24 5 and state 246 constitutions were violated when
he, upon retrial before a new trial judge, received a harsher
sentence than originally imposed by the first trial judge. 247 The
court held that the defendant's procedural due process rights were
violated.248

A jury convicted defendant of first and second degree armed
robbery, and the trial judge sentenced defendant to concurrent
terms of five to ten years and four to eight years. The appellate
division reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial
judge failed to instruct the jury that the prosecution had to disprove the defendant's alibi beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 9 Upon
retrial, before a new trial judge, defendant was again convicted
of first and second degree armed robbery. However, this judge
imposed increased concurrent terms of seven and one half to fifteen years and six to twelve years. The trial judge imposed a
harsher sentence because he believed that the defendant coerced
his sister and brother-in-law into establishing an unbelievable alibi, and because a complaining witness was forced to come back
to court to testify, thereby reliving the trauma of the incident. 250
In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals held that the imposition of a harsher sentence by a trial judge creates a presump243. Id.
244. 76 N.Y.2d 156, 556 N.E.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1990).
245. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
246. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
247. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d at 161, 556 N.E.2d at 425, 556 N.Y.S.2d at

986.
248. Id. at 158, 556 N.E.2d at 424, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
249. Id. at 158-59, 556 N.E.2d at 424, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
250. Id. at 159, 556 N.E.2d at 424, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
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tion of institutional vindictiveness. 25 1 This presumption can only
be overcome if the trial judge, upon resentencing, justifies the
harsher sentence with*evidence that became known or available
only after the first sentence was imposed. Here, the court ruled
that the defendant's due process rights were violated because the
trial judge failed to offer ample justification for imposing the
2
harsher sentence. 25
The court began its analysis by stating that under certain circumstances the United States Constitution's due process clause
shields a criminal defendant from receiving a harsher sentence
imposed upon retrial if it is determined that the second trial
judge's reasons were vindictive or punitive. In North Carolina v.
Pearce,25 3 the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant's due process rights under the Federal Constitution are
violated when a trial judge, the same judge who sentenced the defendant in the first trial, imposes a more severe sentence after a
second trial without identifying the reasons for imposing the
harsher sentence. According to the Supreme Court, this rule, the
so-called "Pearce presumption," is designed to reduce judicial
vindictiveness or the perception thereof, thereby eliminating any
apprehension by the defendant that his choice to appeal will result
25 4
in a more severe sentence.
The Pearce Court left open the issue of whether the Pearce
presumption is applicable to instances where the criminal defendant is given an increased sentence by someone other than the
original sentencer. That issue was subsequently decided in Texas
v. McCullough,25 5 where the Supreme Court rendered Pearce
inapplicable to cases where the sentencers in each case are different. In that case, the Court concluded that there was no federal
due process violation when the second sentencer, a trial judge,
imposed a harsher sentence than that imposed by the original
sentencer, a jury. 256
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 161, 556 N.E.2d at 425, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
Id. at 161-62, 556 N.E.2d at 425-26, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 986-87.
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Id. at 725.
475 U.S. 134 (1986).
Id. at 141.
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In Van Pelt, the court of appeals chose not to follow
7
McCullough and decided the issue under the state constitution. 25
Stating that "our State due' process provision confers a more
protective benefit than the Federal counterpart, ' '25 8 the court
held that in New York the existence of two different sentencers
does not eradicate the Pearce presumption. 259 The existence of
two sentencers is only a factor in overcoming the presumption.
The court explained that the due process clause found in article
one, section six of the state constitution requires the presumption
"as a procedural safeguard against punitively toughened
sentences .... "260 To overcome the presumption, there must be
some articulation on the record by the trial judge indicating an
event subsequent to the first conviction upon which the harsher
sentence ought to be justified.
The court offered several reasons for providing the criminal defendant increased protection under the state constitution. First,
appeals under the Pearcepresumption will be few in number thus
not overburdening the appellate courts. Second, the potential for
denial of the defendant's due process rights significantly overrides any burden placed upon the sentencing process. Third, the
257. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d at 161, 556 N.E.2d at 425, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
986.

258. Id. at 162, 556 N.E.2d at 426, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
259. Id. In People v. Miller, 65 N.Y.2d 502, 482 N.E.2d 892, 493

N.Y.S.2d 96, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 951 (1985), the court of appeals held that
the Pearce presumption did not apply even though a criminal defendant
received a harsher sentence upon retrial for making a victim, who was raped
by the defendant, testify in court. That case is distinguishable, however,
because the original sentence was a result of a plea bargain struck in exchange
for sparing the victim from having to testify in court. On appeal of the plea
bargain, the defendant breached the agreement by forcing the victim to testify.
This breach, according to the Miller court, justified the imposition of a harsher
sentence.
The court of appeals in Van Pelt distinguished Miller on the basis that the
defendant made no plea bargain agreement to receive a reduced sentence for
sparing the complaining witness from having to testify. The court stated that
having a witness testify twice does not constitute a rebuttal of the Pearce
presumption.
260. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d at 161, 556 N.E.2d at 425, 556 N.Y.S.2d at

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1991

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1991], Art. 22

DUE PROCESS

1991]

283

presumption is easily rebutted if the trial judge documents a justifiable reason for the increased sentence. Fourth, the presumption will not interfere with the state's interest in providing the
trial judge full discretion and flexibility in sentencing the defendant. Lastly, the court, following the rationale in Pearce, believed that the threat of a harsher sentence upon reconviction
might deter the defendant in exercising his or her right to appeal. 26

1

People v. Harris 262
(decided July 5, 1990)

Defendant claimed that his right to be present at a material
stage of his trial was violated when the trial judge communicated
with the jury outside his presence, 2 63 thus violating his state 264
and federal 26 5 right to due process of law. The court of appeals
held that the defendant's presence was not constitutionally
mandated when the trial judge, accompanied by the prosecutor
and the defense attorney, asked the jury to clarify its request for
testimony readback, characterizing the communication as
ministerial in nature. 266 Therefore, the defendant's procedural
due process rights were not violated. 267
At defendant's trial, on charges of sodomy and other offenses,
the jury sent a note to the judge requesting a readback of certain
trial testimony. Accompanied by the prosecutor and defendant's
attorney, the judge proceeded to the jury room for a clarification
of the readback request. Specifically, the judge asked whether the
jurors wanted to hear testimony about the victim, or by the
261. Id. at 162-63, 556 N.E.2d at 426-27, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 987-88.
262. 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1990).
263. Id. at 811-12, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
264. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
266. Harris,76 N.Y.2d at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
No mention is made in the majority opinion of whether the defendant brought

his case under the United States or New York Constitution or both. The
dissent refers to defendant's rights under both constitutions. Id. at 813, 559
N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
267. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
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